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he security detention policies applied by military forces of the United 
States, United Kingdom and other Western countries associated with what 
the George W. Bush Administration initially dubbed the “Global War on 
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Terrorism” (GWOT)1 are finding themselves subject to increasing judicial 
scrutiny. As a result, some of the legal assumptions that accompanied early 
applications of such policies are being reconsidered. For example, the 
judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld2 essentially de-
bunked the argument that the GWOT (as pursued against the Taliban, Al 
Qaeda and associated forces) and the exercise of detention powers in con-
nection with its execution are regulated by neither international humanitari-
an law (IHL) rules governing international armed conflict (IAC) nor IHL 
rules governing non-international armed conflicts (NIAC).3 Likewise, the 
                                                                                                                      
1. The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). The term 
“Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) is used throughout the article to describe the set of 
loosely-connected military operations launched by the United States and some of its allies, 
after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, against terrorist groups affiliated with Al 
Qaeda, whose members were located in several predominantly Muslim states, including 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia. 
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
3. A full doctrinal analysis of the many classification issues and geographical nuances 
of the GWOT exceeds the scope of the present article. It is safe to state, however, that it 
appears that many detainees involved in recent conflicts would not qualify as prisoners of 
war (POWs) under IAC, since they do not qualify as either “Members of the Armed Forc-
es of a party” or members of other militias “belonging to a Party to the conflict”—
typically understood as a belligerent State. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTIL-
ITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 54–55 (3d ed. 2016). Many 
detainees also fail to meet the substantive criteria for POW status enumerated in the Third 
Geneva Convention, including the use of a fixed distinctive sign and a respect for the laws 
and customs of war in the conduct of their operations. Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinaf-
ter Third Geneva Convention]. Nor would such individuals qualify as protected persons 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, entitled to Section IV safeguards, since this status 
depends on inter-State belligerency (and, in any event, many of the detention-related pro-
tections associated with this status are only relevant to situations of belligerent occupa-
tion). Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 
4, 79–141, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva 
Convention]. 
Furthermore, while the proposition that the GWOT is fought on a global battlefield 
is highly controversial, it is safe to assert that there is broad support in the literature for 
classifying certain inter-parties interactions comprising the GWOT, such as post-transition 
armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as NIACs in line with the holding of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Hamdan. Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than 
Meets the Eye, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 186, 196 (2011); Marko 
Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BEL-












2015 judgment of the UK Court of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed and Others v. 
Secretary of State for Defence4 rejected the position that IHL rules governing 
NIAC can serve as the basis for prolonged detention without trial of sus-
pected international terrorists. Although some aspects of the judgment 
were reversed on appeal by the UK Supreme Court in 2017, the position of 
the Court of Appeal on detention under NIAC remains intact.5 Arguably, 
the combined effect of the Hamdan and Serdar Mohammad judgments pre-
sents a challenge to a “hardline” legal position, in which IHL can serve as 
an independent basis for the prolonged detention of “enemy combatants” 
until the end of hostilities, outside the four corners of the prisoner of war 
(POW) regime applicable in IACs. 
The growing acceptance of international human rights law (IHRL) doc-
trines on the co-applicability of rules of IHL and IHRL in times of armed 
conflict and on the extra-territorial application of certain IHRL norms 
serves as yet another impetus for re-examining existing policies on security 
detention. If IHL cannot serve anymore as an exclusive basis for the deten-
tion of international terrorists, then other bodies of law (e.g., national legis-
lation, United Nations Security Council resolutions), may provide the nec-
essary legal basis for such detention. Still, such alternative legal bases may 
need to be interpreted in an IHRL-friendly manner, or be read subject to 
relevant IHRL provisions. Furthermore, even if IHL continues to govern 
certain security detentions, in a world of co-application and extra-territorial 
application, IHRL arguably should influence the interpretation and applica-
tion of IHL, including its provisions on security detentions. 
The present article discusses one principal IHRL challenge to detention 
without trial of suspected international terrorists—the need to introduce an 
upper limit on the duration of security detention in order to render it not 
indefinite in length. Although even open-ended security detentions may 
                                                                                                                      
2013); Sasha Radin, Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 696, 705–06 (2013). But see DINSTEIN, 
supra, at 66. Note that the classification of a specific conflict between a State and a non-
State party comprising part of the GWOT as a NIAC for the purpose of regulating the 
detention of enemy combatants does not exclude the possibility of the parallel applicability 
of IAC rules governing protection of civilians to cross-border operations not consented to 
by the relevant territorial State. For a discussion, see Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed 
Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
CONFLICTS 77 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2013). 
4. Serdar Mohammed and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA 
(Civ) 843. 













come to an end at some point in time, upon the occurrence of an interrup-
tive event (e.g., the end of active hostilities or a change in risk assessment), 
there are three critical elements which justify classifying these security de-
tentions as indefinite in nature. They are: (1) the acute lack of certainty that 
the detainee experiences about the overall length of detention; (2) the lack 
of control by the detainee over the conditions which would bring the de-
tention to an end; and (3) the practical feasibility of the detention period 
being extended indefinitely—perhaps for the entire duration of the detain-
ee’s life. 
Following these introductory comments, Part II describes the “hard-
line” position on GWOT-related detention adopted by the United States in 
the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks and followed, with cer-
tain variations, by other countries, including the United Kingdom and the 
State of Israel. According to this “hardline” position, international terror-
ism suspects can be deprived of their liberty without trial for the duration 
of the armed conflict in which the organizations they are affiliated with 
participate, in the same way in which “enemy combatants” can be detained 
without trial as POWs for the duration of an IAC. Part III describes judi-
cial and quasi-judicial challenges to the “hardline” position: the Hamdan 
and Serdar Mohammad judgments in the United States and the UK, the A v. 
Secretary of Defence judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court, the Al-Jedda and 
Hassan judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and 
the non-binding recommendations of the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) codified in its General Comment 35. Part IV addresses recent de-
velopments in IHRL relating to the co-application of the IHL and IHRL 
and the extra-territoriality of certain IHRL norms. It specifically discusses 
developments relating to the application of IHRL norms governing securi-
ty detentions. Finally, Part V concludes by offering an IHRL-based per-
spective to the GWOT-related detention policy and, in particular, to as-
pects of the policy leading to the de facto placement of international terror-
ism suspects under a regime of indefinite detention. 
 
II. THE “HARDLINE” POSITION 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States assumed custody of thousands 
of individuals suspected of participating in hostilities against the United 












forces.6 Some of them were detained in Guantanamo Bay; others were kept 
in overseas military facilities, such as Bagram prison in Afghanistan; and yet 
others were detained in transitory places of custody, including military brigs 
on the U.S. mainland and on board naval vessels, and “black prison” sites 
in a number of locations around the world.7 Under U.S. domestic law, the 
authority to detain suspected terrorists implicated in the GWOT without 
criminal charges originally emanated from the 2001 Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (AUMF),8 as well as from President George W. Bush’s 
Military Order of November 13, 2001, authorizing the detention of indi-
viduals who are or have been members of Al Qaeda, or were involved in 
other international terrorism attacks against the United States, its citizens 
and national interests, as well as individuals harboring such terrorists.9 
The legal position underlying the power to detain individuals without 
criminal charges was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2004 
Hamdi judgment, in which the Court accepted the claim that suspected in-
ternational terrorists qualifying as “enemy combatants”10—including U.S. 
citizens—may be detained without trial for the duration of the conflict. 
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice O’Connor opined that: 
 
The AUMF authorizes the President to use “all necessary and appropriate 
force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 115 Stat. 224. There can be no 
doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghani-
stan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the 
                                                                                                                      
6. According to the Costs of War Project, hosted by the Watson Institute for Interna-
tional and Foreign Affairs at Brown University, “The United States government detained 
well over 100,000 people for various periods in conjunction with the War on Terror in the 
years since 9/11.” Detention, COSTS OF WAR, http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/ 
social/rights/detention (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). 
7. See, e.g., Council of Eur., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Deten-
tions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States: Sec-
ond Report, Eur. Parl. Doc. 11302 rev. (June 11, 2007) (by Dick Marty). 
8. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
See also 50 U.S.C § 1541 (2017). 
9. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
10. An enemy combatant was narrowly defined by the U.S. government for the pur-
pose of the Hamdi litigation as an individual who was “part of or supporting forces hostile 
to the United States or coalition partners” in Afghanistan and who “engaged in an armed 
conflict against the United States” there. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526 (2004) 













al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals 
Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that deten-
tion of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for 
the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so 
fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the 
“necessary and appropriate force” Congress has authorized the President 
to use.11 
 
The United States continues to detain individuals on the Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Base and in Afghanistan for the duration of “the particular con-
flict in which they were captured” on the basis of the AUMF, whose au-
thorization to detain “enemy combatants” for the duration of the conflict 
was considered by Justice O’Connor to be “based on longstanding law-of-
war principles.”12 
A comparable legal framework was introduced in Israel through the 
enactment of the 2002 Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, which 
authorized the detention without trial of “unlawful combatants,” defined as 
individuals taking part directly or indirectly in armed hostilities against the 
State of Israel or belonging to an armed force engaged in hostilities against 
the State of Israel, who do not qualify for POW status under the Third 
Geneva Convention.13 Although the 2002 Law provides that the detention 
of “unlawful combatants” would be reviewed by Israeli courts every six 
months, so as to ascertain whether or not their release would harm the se-
curity of the State or is justified for other reasons,14 Section 7 of the 2002 
Law provides that membership in a hostile organization or participation in 
the organization’s hostile activities creates a rebuttable presumption of 
harm to State security upon release for as long as hostilities continue. The 
upshot of this legal construction is that Israeli lawmakers attempted to cre-
ate a legal framework that would meet relevant local constitutional and in-
ternational law sensitivities, while facilitating the prolonged (in fact, indefi-
nite) detention of “unlawful combatants” (who, by definition, do not quali-
                                                                                                                      
11. Id. at 518. 
12. Id. at 521. See also THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY 
FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED 
NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 28 (2016) (“The United States bases its authority to 
detain these individuals on the 2001 AUMF as informed by the law of armed conflict.”). 
13. Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, SH No. 1834 § 2 (Isr.), 
reprinted in 32 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 389 (2003) (translation available at 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2011/240_eng.pdf). 












fy for POW status), for the duration of the armed conflict in which the ter-
rorist organizations with which they are affiliated are involved.15 
In the UK, two frameworks for prolonged detention developed in spe-
cific legal contexts that are broadly consistent with the “hardline” position. 
The first framework is based on domestic immigration law. Between 2001 
and 2004, domestic immigration law was employed to indefinitely detain 
(without criminal charges) suspected foreign terrorists, who could not be 
deported from the UK by virtue of legal or practical considerations (such 
as a concern that they would be exposed to torture in the receiving State, 
or because of their statelessness). Such detention was authorized by the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which contained a process 
for certification of suspected foreign terrorists whose presence in the UK 
constituted a risk to national security.16 A terrorist was defined under sec-
tion 21(2) of the 2001 Act as an individual who is “concerned in the com-
mission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism,” “a 
member of or belongs to an international terrorist group,” or an individual 
who “has links with an international terrorist group.” Although it was ac-
companied by a derogation from IHRL treaties, the 2001 Act did not pur-
port to rely on IHL as a basis for detention, but rather on immigration law, 
and on the need to protect national security in times of emergency.17 
A second legal framework to justify prolonged detention without trial 
of suspected terrorists was employed by UK armed forces overseas, based 
on relevant Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In Iraq, the UK, like other members of the Multi-National Force, relied on 
                                                                                                                      
15. See, in particular, id. § 1 (“This Law is intended to regulate the incarceration of 
unlawful combatants not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in a manner conforming with 
the obligations of the State of Israel under the provisions of international humanitarian 
law.”). See also Draft Bill for Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants (O.R. Draft), 5760-
2000, HH No. 2883, p. 416, (Isr.)(“The Bill is intended to anchor the authority, which is 
consistent with IHL, to detain members of hostile forces not qualifying as POW for the 
duration of the conflict.”). It should be noted that one impetus for the passage of the 2002 
law is a 2000 Supreme Court judgment indicating that Israel’s existing security detention 
legislation—the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979—did not authorize group-
based detention, but rather required the State to establish the personal risk emanating 
from each detained individual. CrimA 7048/97 Anonymous Persons v. Minister of De-
fense 54(1) PD 721 (2000) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/97/480/070/a09/ 
97070480.a09.pdf. 
16. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, § 21. 
17. Unlimited immigration detention is also practiced in Australia pursuant to section 
189 of the Migration Act 1958 with regard to aliens who are non-deportable, yet non-













Security Council Resolutions 1511 (2003) and 1546 (2004), authorizing “all 
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stabil-
ity in Iraq,”18 to justify the security detention regime introduced by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Memorandum No. 3. This Mem-
orandum invoked, in turn, provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
on internment (detention without trial for imperative reasons of security, 
reviewable every six months).19 Still, according to UK authorities, Security 
Council Resolution 1546 and its subsequent extensions implied that the 
end of belligerent occupation in Iraq in 2004 did not terminate the authori-
ty of Coalition forces to undertake security detentions for prolonged peri-
ods of time.20 A similar claim was made by the UK with regard to the effect 
of Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1386 (2001), authoriz-
ing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to 
“take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate” (i.e., to assist the Afghan 
authorities in maintaining security).21 
Finally, it should be noted that domestic security detention laws, avail-
able in a number of countries confronting armed violence,22 also permit, at 
times, prolonged preventive detention without trial for as long as the rele-
vant security threat remains in place. Such preventive detention measures 
are, however, subject to periodic reviews in order to ascertain the contin-
ued necessity of detention, or to periodic renewal of detention orders. Alt-
hough not directly related to the post-9/11 GWOT, this type of security 
detention is also largely compatible with the “hardline” position to security 
detention of suspected international terrorists, as it may facilitate security 
detention for an indefinite period of time in conflict situations. 
 
                                                                                                                      
18. S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 13 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10 (June 8, 2004). 
19. Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 3 (Revised) § 6(4) (June 27, 
2004), http://www.refworld.org/docid/469cd1b32.html. 
20. See R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] 
UKHL 58, [32] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (“[A]lthough the appellant was not detained 
during the period of the occupation, both the evidence and the language of UNSCR 1546 
(2004) and the later resolutions strongly suggest that the intention was to continue the pre-
existing security regime and not to change it.”). 
21. S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). Security Council Resolution 1386 was extended by 
numerous Security Council resolutions including S.C. Res. 1510 (Oct. 13, 2003), S.C. Res. 
1833 (Sept. 22, 2008), S.C. Res. 1868 (Mar. 23, 2009), S.C. Res. 1890 (Oct. 8, 2009) and 
S.C. Res. 2120 (Oct. 10, 2013). 
22. See, e.g., Internal Security Act, sec. 8, (Singapore); Internal Security Act 1960 (Act 
82), sec. 8 (Malaysia); Law No. 162 of 1958 (Emergency Law), 5 June 1967, art. 3 (Egypt); 












III. JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO THE “HARDLINE” POSITION 
 
A. Authority to Detain under IHL 
 
The “hardline” position, which is consistent with the proposition that IHL 
rules governing the GWOT allow for detention without trial of terrorists 
qualifying as “enemy combatants” for the duration of the conflict, has 
come under increased judicial and quasi-judicial scrutiny. As a result of this 
scrutiny, a more nuanced legal approach to the exercise of security deten-
tion powers has emerged. 
One important development was the rejection by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld judgment of the claim that the fight 
against international terrorism is regulated neither by Common Article 2 
nor by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.23 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Stevens wrote in Hamdan that all armed conflicts that do 
not qualify as international in nature—that is, between two State parties to 
the Geneva Conventions—are by necessary implication governed by 
Common Article 3 (notwithstanding their cross-border attributes and glob-
al reach): 
 
[T]here is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies 
here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories. Article 3, 
often referred to as Common Article 3 because, like Article 2, it appears 
in all four Geneva Conventions, provides that in a “conflict not of an in-
ternational character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum,” certain provisions protecting “[p]ersons taking no active part 
in the hostilities . . . .24 
 
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not reject in Hamdan its previous 
decision in Hamdi, according to which “enemy combatants” could be de-
tained without criminal charges for the entire duration of the armed con-
flict. Still, the decision to treat the GWOT as regulated by Common Article 
3, an article governing NIACs, does invite, in turn, the question of whether 
IHL rules governing NIACs can provide States with legal authority to in-
definitely detain “enemy combatants,” which would allow them to continue 
                                                                                                                      
23. See John Yoo, Terrorists Have No Geneva Rights, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (May 26, 
2004), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108552765884721335. 













to maintain that such detention is based on longstanding law-of-war prin-
ciples.25 Two recent decisions by the ECtHR and the UK Court of Appeal 
appear to answer this latter question in the negative. 
In Hassan v. UK (2014), the ECtHR reviewed, inter alia, the authority of 
the UK to detain without trial an Iraqi individual suspected of participating 
in armed hostilities in territories occupied by the UK in Iraq, and held that 
such legal powers were conferred upon the UK forces by relevant provi-
sions governing security detention in the Third and Fourth Geneva Con-
ventions. It also held that these powers of detention allow the UK to devi-
ate from the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) on the right to liberty only in situations of IAC.26 This implies that 
no similar powers of detention exist under IHL rules governing NIACs; or 
that, alternatively, detention based on IHL rules applicable in NIACs must 
strictly conform to the requirements of the ECHR. 
Whereas Hassan v. UK only reviewed implicitly the power of detention 
under IHL rules governing NIACs, this question was at the very heart of 
the Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defence judgment issued in 2015 
by the UK Court of Appeal. The case dealt, inter alia, with the question of 
whether or not the UK had legal authority to detain without criminal 
charges a suspected Taliban militant in Afghanistan for a number of 
months. Since the ISAF, in which the UK participated, was not considered 
to be an occupying power in Afghanistan in 2010, the UK was barred from 
relying on the security detention regime found in the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions. The relevant Security Council resolution authorizing 
ISAF activities,27 on which the government relied, was narrowly construed 
by the Court of Appeal as permitting only very short-term detention (i.e., 
prior to the transfer of terrorist suspects to the Afghan authorities or im-
mediate release), and so the Court was left with the possibility that only 
IHL could provide the basis for Serdar Mohammed’s security detention. 
After determining that the armed conflict in which the UK was involved in 
Afghanistan constituted an “internationalized NIAC”—a NIAC with 
cross-border features—and following an elaborate analysis of treaty law, 
                                                                                                                      
25. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
26. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, ¶ 104 (2014) (Eur. Ct. H.R.), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146501 (“It can only be in 
cases of international armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners and the detention of 
civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted features of international humanitarian 
law, that Article 5 could be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such broad powers.”).  












customary international law and new developments in the positions of 
States on the issue of security detention (such as the Copenhagen Pro-
cess),28 the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that no basis for pro-
longed security detention exists under IHL rules governing NIACs (alt-
hough it acknowledged that a rule authorizing such detention ought to be 
developed in order to provide an alternative to killing enemy combatants 
on the battlefield): 
 
[W]e have concluded that in its present stage of development it is not 
possible to find authority under international humanitarian law to detain 
in an internationalised non-international armed conflict by implication 
from the relevant treaty provisions, Common Article 3 and APII. As to 
customary international law, despite the interplay of treaty-based sources 
of international humanitarian law and customary international law 
sources, the possibility that the requirements for the emergence of a cus-
tomary rule of international law may be less stringent in the case of the 
emergence of a customary rule of international humanitarian law, and the 
position of the ICRC, we do not consider that it is possible to base au-
thority to detain in a non-international armed conflict on customary in-
ternational law.29 
 
It should be noted that the UK Supreme Court reversed on appeal the 
position of the Court of Appeal on the question of authority to detain pur-
suant to Security Council resolutions, thus rendering moot the question of 
whether or not IHL rules governing NIACs constitute an independent le-
gal basis for detention. Still, those judges that expressed a view on the mat-
ter in their decisions (writing for the majority obiter dicta or dissenting) tend-
ed to support the views of the Court of Appeal on the lack of a legal basis 
under IHL for detention in post-transition Iraq and Afghanistan.30 The up-
shot of this analysis is that, according to UK courts, IHL rules governing 
NIACs do not appear to provide an independent legal basis for security 
detentions. Thus, as explained in Part IV below, resort must be made to 
other bodies of law, primarily IHRL, in order to determine the legality un-
der international law of such detentions. 
                                                                                                                      
28. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
29. Serdar Mohammed and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA 
(Civ) 843 [251]. 
30. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, [14] (Lord Sumption SCJ), 













Doubts as to whether IHL rules governing NIACs provide a legal basis 
for the detention without trial of suspected terrorists also manifest them-
selves in the academic literature.31 Such doubts have not been put to rest by 
the inter-State Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines, which fo-
cused on the treatment of detainees in NIAC, and not on the legal basis for 
their detention.32 In any event, there appears to be broad consensus around 
the proposition that even if an authority to undertake security detentions 
can be derived from IHL rules governing NIACs—e.g., by way of analogy 
from the rules governing IACs,33 or by way of a necessary implication from 
the authority to kill on the battlefield individuals directly participating in 
hostilities—such rules are currently under-developed and do not provide 
exhaustive guidance on critical issues such as the precise grounds for deten-
tion, the procedural safeguards available and, arguably, the total length of 
security detention.34 
                                                                                                                      
31. See, e.g., ELS DEBUF, CAPTURED IN WAR: LAWFUL INTERNMENT IN ARMED CON-
FLICT 473–77 (2013); Gabor Rona, Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict 
Detention Dilemma?, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 32, 35 (2015); Ashley S. Deeks, Ad-
ministrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 403, 404–5 (2009); Francoise J. Hampson, Is Human Rights Law of Any Rele-
vance to Military Operations in Afghanistan?, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALY-
SIS 485, 502–3 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009) (Vol. 89, U.S. Naval War College Interna-
tional Law Studies). But see Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Intern-
ment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 375, 377 (2005); Knut Dörmann, Detention in Non-
International Armed Conflicts, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 347, 349 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. 
Naval War College International Law Studies); David Tuck, Taking of Hostages, in THE 1949 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 297, 310 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta & 
Marco Sassòli eds., 2015); Chatham House & International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-international Armed Conflict, 
91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 859, 862–64 (2009). 
32. The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations: 
Principles and Guidelines (2012), reprinted in 51 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1368 
(2012) [hereinafter The Copenhagen Process] (“During The Copenhagen Process meetings 
participants—while not seeking to create new legal obligations or authorizations under 
international law—confirmed the desire to develop principles to guide the implementation 
of the existing obligations with respect to detention in international military operations.”). 
33. For a discussion, see Ramin Mahnad, Beyond Process: The Material Framework for De-
tention and the Particularities of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 2013 YEARBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 33 (Terry D. Gill et al. eds., 2014). 
34. See, e.g., Jody M. Prescott, Direct Participation in Hostilities and Its Significance for Deten-
tion Standards in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in DETENTION OF NON-STATE ACTORS 













B. Authority to Detain under other Legal Sources 
 
To be clear, even if IHL rules governing NIACs cannot serve as an inde-
pendent basis for security detention, there is nothing in IHL to prevent 
States from relying on domestic legislation or on international law sources 
other than IHL to justify the lawfulness of such detentions.35 Indeed, as 
indicated above, the United States relied on the AUMF as the legal basis 
for its security detention policy, Israel on the Unlawful Combatants Law 
and the UK on its immigration legislation and United Nations Security 
Council resolutions. However, reliance on domestic legislation invites the 
application of relevant constitutional and international law standards, most 
notably IHRL, which includes a detailed body of norms governing depriva-
tion of liberty by State authorities both in times of peace and during times 
of conflict. Furthermore, as explained below, there is support in the prac-
tice of national and international legal institutions for the proposition that 
IHRL may also govern, or at least influence, the contents of international 
law norms authorizing detention of terrorist suspects, including Security 
Council resolutions. 
So far, judicial review of U.S. security detention policy has focused on 
its compatibility with constitutional habeas corpus standards36 and with 
Common Article 3 due process standards.37 While the very power to detain, 
pronounced in Hamdi as derived from the AUMF and deemed consistent 
with the laws of war, still remains intact, it may still be subject to a future 
challenge. First, it could be argued that a winding down of U.S. involve-
ment in the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq—as announced by 
                                                                                                                      
eds., 2016); Chris Jenks, Detention under the Law of Armed Conflict, in ROUTLEDGE HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 301, 310 (Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack eds., 
2016). 
35. The only meaningful restriction found in IHL on the power to detain under other 
bodies of law appears to derive from customary international law, as reflected in Rule 128 
of the ICRC customary law study, which provides that “[p]ersons deprived of their liberty 
in relation to a non-international armed conflict must be released as soon as the reasons 
for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist.” 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 451 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). 
36. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006); Boumedienne v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 













President Obama in his 2013 National Defense University speech38—will 
sooner or later invalidate the legality of continued detention under the 
AUMF39 (and the related provision on the authority to detain found in the 
2012 National Defense Authorization Act),40 or invite a re-evaluation of 
the constitutionality of the continued application of security detention leg-
islation.41 Second, with the passage of time, more and more strain is put on 
the proposition that the laws of war authorize the detention without trial of 
suspected international terrorists until the end of hostilities, even when no 
end to the GWOT appears in sight,42 or is contemplated.43 Thus, even if an 
analogy could be drawn between some aspects of a classic IAC and the 
fight against international terrorism, the extraordinary length of this con-
flict, which has no parallel in contemporary IACs to which IHL’s rules on 
detention of enemy combatants have been applied, stretches the analogy to 
its breaking point.44 Indeed, the very possibility that the analogy would 
break down led the drafter of the plurality opinion in Hamdi, Justice 
O’Connor, to qualify the judgment’s reliance on an IHL principle allowing 
detention until the end of the conflict by using the following words: 
 
If the particular circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those 
of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that 
understanding may unravel, but this is not the situation we face of this 
date.45 
                                                                                                                      
38. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense Uni-
versity (May 23, 2013) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university). 
39. See, e.g., MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 2001 AUTHORIZATION 
FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE: ISSUES CONCERNING ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION 12–
13 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43983.pdf; Harold Hongju Koh, Ending the 
Forever War: One Year After President Obama’s NDU Speech, JUST SECURITY (May 23, 2014), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/10768/harold-koh-forever-war-president-obama-ndu-
speech/. 
40. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 
1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). 
41. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After AUMF, 5 HARVARD NA-
TIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 115, 146 (2014). 
42. For a discussion, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE 
BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 255–56 (2007). 
43. See, e.g., RUPERT SMITH, THE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 291–94 (2005). 
44. See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN 
THE AGE OF TERROR 34 (2008). 













Significantly, in other jurisdictions where prolonged detention without 
trial of suspected international terrorists was resorted to, domestic and in-
ternational courts applied constitutional and international law standards, 
resulting in a restriction of the power to detain, or in the introduction of 
temporal limits on the duration of detention. For example, in Israel, the 
Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law 2002 came under legal chal-
lenge in 2008 in a case involving the security detention of two Gaza-based 
Hezbollah operatives. With respect to the authority to detain under IHL, 
the Supreme Court of Israel held that the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict consti-
tutes an IAC, governed by the relevant provisions on security detention of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention.46 Under such provisions, the power to de-
tain only extends, according to the Court, to individuals whose contribu-
tion to the military effort of the terrorist organization to which they belong, 
or which they support, is non-negligible or non-marginal in nature, and 
who pose an individual risk to national security.47 Furthermore, the Court 
noted that the State refrained from relying on the legislative presumption 
that regarded unlawful combatants constituting—by virtue of their group 
membership or affiliation—a prima facie risk to national security upon re-
lease for the duration of the conflict. It consequently held that as long as 
the State bases security detention decisions on a case-by-case analysis of 
information establishing the individual dangerousness of the detained indi-
viduals, there is no need to examine the compatibility of the presumption 
of dangerousness found in section 7 with IHL and Israeli constitutional 
law.48 This dicta can be understood as indicating a certain uneasiness on the 
part of the Court with the membership-based tilt of the 2002 Law, and 
doubts as to whether detention on the basis of group affiliation complies 
with Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty49 and with the intern-
ment provisions of the Geneva Conventions.50 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Israel held that, as in other security de-
tention contexts, the length of detention under the 2002 Law (which may 
be for the entire duration of the conflict) potentially creates a serious prob-
lem for the application of the principle of proportionality, notwithstanding 
                                                                                                                      
46. CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel 62(4) PD 329, ¶ 17 (2008). 
47. Id., ¶ 21. 
48. Id., ¶ 24. 
49. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752–1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.) https:// 
www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 













the fact that security detention is resorted to in a context which the Court 
viewed to qualify as an IAC.51 As a result, it introduced a legal requirement 
that the longer the period of detention without trial is the heavier the bur-
den on the State to justify the extension of detention orders (judicial re-
views under the 2002 Law take place every six months).52 
The upshot of this legal analysis has been the assimilation of the 2002 
Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law with Israel’s State of Emergen-
cy legislation (which allows security detention under certain conditions for 
renewable six-month periods)53 and with Fourth Geneva Convention 
standards, requiring the State to detain on the basis of an imperative risk to 
security posed by the detainee54 that goes beyond mere membership or af-
filiation with a terrorist or militant organization.55 In practical terms, the 
exercise of periodic judicial review by Israeli courts over security detention 
cases led to the restriction of the period of detention to less than two years 
in the vast majority of security detention cases.56 
In the UK, the immigration law framework allowing for the indefinite 
detention without trial of non-deportable foreign terrorists was revoked 
following judgments by the House of Lords and the ECtHR, which found 
it to be discriminatory and disproportionate and thus incompatible with the 
ECHR.57 The ECtHR also held in the Al-Jedda case that Security Council 
Resolution 1546, the legal basis for the UK’s detention policy in Iraq, 
should be read as incorporating relevant IHRL standards, including the 
prohibition on arbitrary detention.58 Since nothing in the Resolution explic-
itly authorized the UK to hold individuals in indefinite detention without 
criminal charges, the Court held that the UK’s detention practices in Iraq 
                                                                                                                      
51. CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel 62(4) PD 329, ¶ 46 (2008). 
52. Id. 
53. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5739–1979, § 33, 89 (1979) (Isr.), http:// 
www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/1979_emergency_powers_law_detention.pdf. 
54. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 3, arts. 42, 78. 
55. This outcome is generally compatible with the position of the Israeli Supreme 
Court in the Targeted Killing case, which rejected targeting on the basis of mere group affili-
ation without consideration of the nature of relevant individual’s participation in the hos-
tilities. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, 
62(1) PD 507 (2006). 
56. See, e.g., Statistics on Administrative Detention, B’TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/ 
administrative_detention/statistics (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). 
57. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; A and Others 
v. United Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137 (2009). 













violated the ECHR. Although the majority on the UK Supreme Court in 
the recent Al-Waheed case deviated from the position of the ECtHR in Al-
Jedda and held that Security Council Resolutions 1723 (2007)(re Iraq) and 
1890 (2009)(re Afghanistan) implicitly authorized security detentions, the 
Court nonetheless took the view that safeguards against arbitrary detention 
found in Article 5 of the ECHR continue to apply mutatis mutandis to deten-
tions based on these Security Council resolutions, effectively reading-in 
IHRL standards into the resolutions.59 
The upshot of these cases appears to be that whereas States may derive 
the authority to resort to security detentions from domestic legislation or 
international instruments (such as Security Council resolutions), this power 
remains constrained by domestic constitutional principles and IHRL stand-
ards, which govern the international legality of domestic norms and inform 
the interpretation of international instruments granting detention authori-
ty.60 Such IHRL standards include both procedural safeguards (such as ac-
cess to judicial review) and substantive balancing norms (introducing con-
siderations such as a high threshold of security risk justifying detention and 
limits on the overall length of detention). 
A recent codification of IHRL standards relevant to the judicial scruti-
ny of security detentions can be found in paragraph 15 of the UN HRC 
General Comment 35 on the Right to Liberty and Security of Person. This 
statement codifies the practice of the Committee and reflects the consensus 
view of members of the Committee on the interpretation of Article 9 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): 
 
To the extent that States parties impose security detention (sometimes 
known as administrative detention or internment) not in contemplation 
of prosecution on a criminal charge, the Committee considers that such 
                                                                                                                      
59. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2. Lord Reed, writing for the 
minority, was, however, of the view that application of the Al-Jedda judgment should have 
led the Supreme Court to narrowly construe the Security Council resolution and to insist 
upon an explicit authorization for any security detention that goes beyond that recognized 
under domestic Afghani law. 
60. Cf. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 2136/2012, M.M.M. et al v. 
Australia, Comm. No. 2136/2012, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/2136/2012 (2013); U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 2094/2011, F.K.A.G. et al. v. Australia, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/2094/2011 (2013). In both cases, the Human Rights Committee 
found Australia’s practice of detaining asylum seekers for lengthy periods of time without 
criminal charges, on the basis of secret evidence suggesting that their release would jeop-
ardize Australian national security, to be in violation of the International Covenant on 













detention presents severe risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Such 
detention would normally amount to arbitrary detention as other effective 
measures addressing the threat, including the criminal justice system, 
would be available. If, under the most exceptional circumstances, a pre-
sent, direct and imperative threat is invoked to justify the detention of 
persons considered to present such a threat, the burden of proof lies on 
States parties to show that the individual poses such a threat and that it 
cannot be addressed by alternative measures, and that burden increases 
with the length of the detention. States parties also need to show that de-
tention does not last longer than absolutely necessary, that the overall 
length of possible detention is limited and that they fully respect the guar-
antees provided for by article 9 in all cases. Prompt and regular review by 
a court or other tribunal possessing the same attributes of independence 
and impartiality as the judiciary is a necessary guarantee for those condi-
tions, as is access to independent legal advice, preferably selected by the 
detainee, and disclosure to the detainee of, at least, the essence of the evi-
dence on which the decision is taken.61 
 
Most significantly for our purpose, the UN HRC took the position that 
to qualify as non-arbitrary, security detentions must be limited in time. This 
is because indefinite detention may be regarded as representing a dispro-
portionate response to the security threat posed by the detained individual, 
which may even be regarded, due to the mental anguish associated with the 
detainees’ lack of certainty about the time and possibility of their release, a 
form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.62 Argua-
bly, as the next Part illustrates, certain standards developed in IHRL to 
regulate security detentions may be deviated from, but only through an 
overriding legal instrument. For example, the clear language of lex specialis 
treaty provisions, such as the legal regime on POW detention found in the 
                                                                                                                      
61. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security 
of Person), ¶ 9, nn.35–37, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter General 
Comment No. 35]. 
62. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 2233/2013, F.J. et al. v. 
Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR /C/116/D/2233/2013, ¶ 10.6 (2016); U.N. Comm. against 
Torture, Concluding Observations on the Third to Fifth Periodic Reports of United States of America, ¶ 
14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Concluding Observations 
(United States)] (“the Committee reiterates that indefinite detention constitutes per se a 
violation of the Convention”); Towards the Closure of Guantanamo, Inter-Am. Comm’n 












Third Geneva Convention, may authorize detention on the basis of group 
affiliation without the need to establish an individualized security risk.63 
 
IV. THE INCREASED RELEVANCE OF IHRL STANDARDS 
 
In the twenty-one years since the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legali-
ty of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,64 the position that IHRL applies in 
times of armed conflict has attained growing acceptance.65 Even countries 
like the United States and Israel, who initially resisted this approach, seem 
to have subsequently accepted it, albeit somewhat grudgingly, in statements 
before international bodies or other legal instruments produced by official 
State bodies.66 Furthermore, the extra-territorial reach of international in-
struments prohibiting arbitrary detention, such as the ICCPR and ECHR, 
has been confirmed by international law-applying bodies, such as the ICJ,67 
                                                                                                                      
63. Arguably, even the POW regime of the Third Geneva Convention may come un-
der stress were it to apply to prolonged armed conflicts without an end in sight. The dis-
cussion of such a contingency exceeds, however, the scope of the present contribution.  
64. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226 (July 8). 
65. For support, see Larissa van den Herrick & Hellen Duffy, Human Rights Bodies and 
International Humanitarian Law: Common but Differentiated Approaches, in TOWARDS CONVER-
GENCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: APPROACHES OF REGIONAL AND IN-
TERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 366, 370 (Carla Buckley, Alice Donald & Philip Leach eds., 2017); 
OREN GROSS & FIONUALLA NI-AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 361–62 (2006).   
66. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Fourth Period Report: United States of America, ¶ 506, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR /C/USA/4 (May 22, 2012) (“With respect to the application of the Covenant and 
the international law of armed conflict (also referred to as international humanitarian law 
or ‘IHL’), the United States has not taken the position that the Covenant does not apply 
‘in time of war.’ Indeed, a time of war does not suspend the operation of the Covenant to 
matters within its scope of application.”); 2 JACOB TURKEL ET AL., THE PUBLIC COMMIS-
SION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010: ISRAEL’S MECHANISMS 
FOR EXAMINING AND INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS AND CLAIMS OF VIOLATIONS OF 
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (2013), 
http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/newDoc3/The%20Turkel%20Report%20for% 
20website.pdf [hereinafter TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT] (“The Commission is of the 
view that certain human rights norms apply to supplement international humanitarian law 
rather than the separate normative regime of human rights law replacing international hu-
manitarian law.”). 
67. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 111 (July 9) (“In conclusion, the 













ECtHR68 and the UN HRC,69 as well as by a number of domestic courts 
(who have accepted this approach explicitly or implicitly).70 
Still, while there is growing acceptance of the relevance of IHRL for all 
armed conflicts, including conflicts comprising the fight against interna-
tional terrorism, it is also widely accepted that IHL provisions may some-
times deviate from IHRL norms and displace them by virtue of the lex spe-
cialis derogat legi generali principle.71 As recently explained by the UN HRC, 
this principle applies to the IHRL prohibition against arbitrary detention 
(Article 9 of the ICCPR): 
 
While rules of international humanitarian law may be relevant for the 
purposes of the interpretation of article 9, both spheres of law are com-
plementary, not mutually exclusive. Security detention authorized and 
regulated by and complying with international humanitarian law in princi-
ple is not arbitrary.72 
 
                                                                                                                      
in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territo-
ry.”). 
68. Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, ¶ 132 (2011) (Eur. 
Ct. H.R.), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105606 
To date, the Court in its case-law has recognised a number of exceptional circumstances 
capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its own 
territorial boundaries. In each case, the question whether exceptional circumstances exist 
which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction 
extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the particular facts. 
69. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obliga-
tion Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 
(May 26, 2004) 
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant 
rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in 
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if 
not situated within the territory of the State Party. 
70. See, e.g., Smith v. Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [55] (Lord Hope SCJ) 
(UK); HCJ 3239/02 Mar’ab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 57(2) PD 349, ¶ 27 
(2003) (Isr.) (applying Article 9 of the ICCPR to administrative detention in the West 
Bank). 
71. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9); Armed Activ-
ities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 
Rep. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19). 












Thus, whereas IHL explicitly allows for a prolonged deprivation of lib-
erty, as is the case with regard to the internment of POWs for the duration 
of an armed conflict,73 such an authorization may be deemed lex specialis, 
rendering the detention of POWs, in principle, non-arbitrary. Still, it ap-
pears that the presumption of conformity with IHRL articulated by the 
ECtHR in Al-Jedda74 ought to apply here too—namely, that an interpretive 
attempt should be made to construe the relevant IHL rules on restricting 
the liberty of POWs (e.g., relating to release on parole or promise, or repat-
riation of the sick and wounded) in accordance with the parallel norms of 
IHRL. Furthermore, it is difficult to accept that certain fundamental and 
non-derogable IHRL norms, such as the prohibition against cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment, could ever be lawfully stipulated upon,75 implying 
the continued application of some IHRL norms to all security detentions in 
all types of armed conflicts.76 
Where IHL rules do not provide explicitly for a detailed legal regime 
for deprivation of liberty in times of hostilities—as is arguably the case 
with respect to IHL rules governing NIACs—the lex specialis argument los-
es much of its force, and there is a greater justification for applying IHRL 
norms to regulate the terms and duration of such security detentions.77 
This is particularly the case where the IHL arrangements in question do not 
contain humanitarian protections and institutional safeguards correspond-
ing at some level to those existing under IHRL. 
Support for the proposition that rules governing detention under NI-
AC do not displace the application of IHRL detention safeguards is found 
in the aforementioned Serdar Mohammed case, where the UK Court of Ap-
                                                                                                                      
73. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 118. 
74. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, ¶ 102 (2011) (Eur. Ct. H.R.), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612. 
75. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment art. 2.2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention 
against Torture] (“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a 
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked 
as a justification of torture.”). 
76. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPT & DOCTRINE CENTRE, 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 1–10: CAPTURED PERSONS (CPERS) 1–7 (3rd ed., 2015). 
77. Peter Vedel Kessing, Security Detention in UN Peace Operations, in SEARCHING FOR A 
‘PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY’ IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 272, 287 (Kjetil 
Mujezinović Larsen, Camilla G. Guldahl Cooper & Gro Nystuen eds., 2013); Gabor Rona, 
Views from Mars, Views from Venus: Minding the Gap between What We Say and What We Do on 
Terrorism, in THE LONG DECADE: HOW 9/11 CHANGED THE LAW 269, 274 (David Jen-













peal explicitly rejected the claim that IHL authorizes security detention in 
NIACs and held that such detentions must be justified under other legal 
norms and comply with relevant IHRL standards.78 Although the UK Su-
preme Court reversed certain aspects of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, it 
still reached the conclusion that the relevant Security Council resolutions 
conferring authority to detain in Iraq and Afghanistan do not contain suffi-
cient safeguards. Thus, the UK was required to specify in legal instruments 
governing the conduct of its forces, such as their Standard Operating In-
structions, the conditions of detention, and develop adequate institutional 
safeguards in order to comply with the requirements of Article 5 of the 
ECHR. 79 
The proposition that security detentions in NIAC must be IHRL-
compatible also finds support in the jurisprudence of international courts 
and committees. In the aforementioned Hassan case, the ECtHR accepted 
that IHL may stipulate upon Article 5 of the ECHR (which prohibits arbi-
trary detention, but offers a “closed list” of permissible exceptions not in-
cluding security detention in times of conflict), even without a formal der-
ogation, but only in situations constituting an IAC. The Court supported its 
conclusion by way of allusion to: (1) the practice of ECHR member States 
not to derogate from the Convention in situations of IAC (as opposed to 
NIACs, where States have derogated from the Convention in the past)—
suggesting that they may have viewed the rigid conditions of Article 5 as 
not directly applicable to IACs, but potentially applicable to NIACs; and 
(2) the fact that IHL includes in IACs safeguards comparable, at some lev-
el, to those found in IHRL, a fact which facilitates the process of interpre-
                                                                                                                      
78. Serdar Mohammed and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA 
(Civ) 843, [280–81]. 
79. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, [67] (Lord Sumption SCJ) 
Given that the Security Council Resolutions themselves contain no procedural safeguards, 
it is incumbent on Convention states, if they are to comply with article 5, to specify the 
conditions on which their armed forces may detain people in the course of an armed con-
flict and to make adequate means available to detainees to challenge the lawfulness of 
their detention under their own law. There is no reason why a Convention state should 
not comply with its Convention obligations by adopting a standard at least equivalent to 
articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as those participating in armed con-
flicts under the auspices of the United Nations commonly do. Provided that the standard 
thus adopted is prescribed by law and not simply a matter of discretion, I cannot think 
that it matters to which category the armed conflict in question belongs as a matter of in-
ternational humanitarian law. The essential purpose of article 5, as the court observed at 
para 105 of Hassan, is to protect the individual from arbitrariness. This may be achieved 
even in a state of armed conflict if there are regular reviews providing ‘sufficient guaran-












tive adjustment of Article 5 to situations of IAC.80 Arguably, the lack of 
comparable safeguards in NIAC underscored the Court’s resistance to de-
viate from the terms of Article 5 in conflict situations not qualifying as 
IACs. 
A similar position appears to have been adopted by the UN HRC in 
paragraph 66 of its General Comment No. 35, where the Committee insin-
uated that the scope of the power to derogate from the right to liberty in 
situations of emergency is broader in IACs than NIACs.81 Thus, without 
determining whether or not IHL rules governing NIACs offer an inde-
pendent legal basis for detention, the UN HRC opined that detention in 
such conflicts remains subject to strict legal controls, including limits on its 
overall duration.82 
In sum, there appears to be support in the case law of national and in-
ternational legal bodies for the application of IHRL to security detentions 
taking place in the context of NIACs. This applies not only to the scope of 
the power to detain without trial—i.e., who is detainable and for what peri-
od of time—but also to the terms of judicial or administrative review of 
decisions to detain83 and to conditions of detention and the manner of 
                                                                                                                      
80. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, ¶ 104 (2014) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
81. General Comment No. 35, supra note 61, ¶66 
During international armed conflict, substantive and procedural rules of international hu-
manitarian law remain applicable and limit the ability to derogate, thereby helping to miti-
gate the risk of arbitrary detention. Outside that context, the requirements of strict neces-
sity and proportionality constrain any derogating measures involving security detention, 
which must be limited in duration and accompanied by procedures to prevent arbitrary 
application, as explained in paragraph 15 above, including review by a court within the 
meaning of paragraph 45 above. 
82. Id. 
83. See, for example, the reference to periodic review of detention in Articles 43 and 
78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which does not appear in any text governing NIAC. 
Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be enti-
tled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or ad-
ministrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the internment 
or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall pe-
riodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the 
favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit. 
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 43 (emphasis added). 
Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a 
regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provi-
sions of the present Convention. This procedure shall include the right of appeal for the 
parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. In the event of 
the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six 
months, by a competent body set up by the said Power. 













treatment of detained individuals, which are specified in IAC but not in 
NIAC. In the latter case too, the detailed IHL rules governing treatment of 
detainees under IAC—which sometimes provide detainees with more gen-
erous protections than those afforded to them under IHRL84—leave only 
limited room for the residual application of IHRL, whereas the few rules 
governing detention under NIAC allow considerable space for comple-
mentary regulation under IHRL.85 
The same conclusion—that is, that IHRL standards should govern im-
portant aspects of security detentions of international terrorism suspects—
would also be warranted even were we to take the position that the Hamdan 
judgment should be read not as classifying the GWOT as a NIAC, but ra-
ther as proposing that Common Article 3 provides a “normative floor” ap-
plicable to all individuals not protected by other provisions of the Geneva 
Convention.86 This is because the limited normative density of the regulato-
ry regime governing security detentions under this alternative construction 
would still be too sparse in its contents to displace the application of IHRL 
under the lex specialis doctrine and the “comparable safeguards” rationale. 
For the sake of completeness, one should also consider whether cus-
tomary international law pertaining to detentions in NIAC (or to other 
forms of detention governed by Common Article 3) has developed specific 
                                                                                                                      
84. See, for example, the prohibition in Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention 
on exposure to “any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind,” which affords 
POWs a higher level of protection against coercive interrogation than that found in the 
Convention against Torture. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 17. 
85. Common Article 3 provides a right to humane treatment and non-discrimination 
of detainees, requiring, in particular, protection from violence against their life and person, 
prohibition against hostage taking and outrages upon personal dignity and certain due 
process guarantees. Few additional protections for health, safety and religious interests are 
found in Article 5 of Additional Protocol II. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
86. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A 
MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 125–26 (2d ed. 2015) (citing, inter alia, in support DoD Directive 
2310.01E). Matthew C. Waxman, The Law of Armed Conflict and Detention Operations in Af-
ghanistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 343, 346–
47. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 218 (June 27) 
Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 defines 
certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non-international character. There is 
no doubt that, in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules also constitute a 













rules that deviate from, and which could potentially displace, the relevant 
IHRL provisions. It is notable in this regard that the ICRC Customary Law 
Study identified several important developments in State practice which 
transpose legal standards originally developed in IACs to NIACs, and ex-
tend to all NIACs certain standards articulated in the Second Additional 
Protocol (with respect to a specific sub-category of NIACs involving con-
trol of territory by a non-State group).87 Significantly, unlike some of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross customary law study rules which 
have been challenged by States,88 it does not appear that any of the stand-
ards relating to detention in NIAC have been subject to any real controver-
sy; to the contrary, many of these standards have also been endorsed by the 
non-binding Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines, which are 
likely to result in a further consolidation of the relevant State practice.89 
Of particular relevance to the present discussion is Rule 128 of the 
ICRC Customary Law Study, which provides: 
 
A. Prisoners of war must be released and repatriated without delay after 
the cessation of active hostilities. [IAC] B. Civilian internees must be re-
leased as soon as the reasons which necessitated internment no longer ex-
ist, but at the latest as soon as possible after the close of active hostilities. 
[IAC] C. Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a non-
international armed conflict must be released as soon as the reasons for 
the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist. [NIAC] The persons re-
ferred to may continue to be deprived of their liberty if penal proceedings 
are pending against them or if they are serving a sentence lawfully im-
posed.90 
 
This Rule certainly supports the proposition that detention without trial 
of suspected terrorists which is not justified by military necessity is unlaw-
                                                                                                                      
87. For a list of the customary IHL rules applicable to persons deprived of their liber-
ty, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribu-
tion to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (2005) 175, 198 (including prohibitions on corporal punish-
ment, use of human shields, enforced disappearances, collective punishment and sexual 
attacks, and requirements for segregation of minors from adults and women from men in 
places of detention and for contact of detainees with the outside world). 
88. See e.g., John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007). 
89. See The Copenhagen Process, supra note 32. 













ful under customary IHL. It would be difficult, however, to construe this 
“thin” rule in a manner that would displace all other relevant IHRL stand-
ards on arbitrary detention, including the prohibition against indefinite de-
tention without trial.91 To the contrary, the application of the Al-Jedda pre-
sumption against the intent of international lawmakers to displace IHRL, 
the doubts expressed in the Serdar Mohammed case as to whether IHL rules 
governing NIACs provide a proper legal authority to detain and the inter-
national criticism directed against indefinite detention arrangements prac-
ticed in connection with the GWOT, should lead us to construe Rule 128 
narrowly, leaving intact the application of basic IHRL principles, including 
the principle that no indefinite security detention should be allowed. 
Since security detentions undertaken in the context of the GWOT do 
not, mostly, lend themselves to the application of IHL rules governing 
IACs, and since no other regulatory framework explicitly authorizing indef-
inite detention can be found under IHL treaties or customary IHL, there is 
nothing in IHL which can stipulate upon the relevant and applicable rules 
of IHRL governing the length of security detentions. Hence, the prohibi-
tion against arbitrary detention, which, according to the UN HRC, includes 
a requirement that “the overall length of possible detention is limited” 92—
i.e., not be indefinite in length—continues to apply to the GWOT, even in 
emergency situations. Furthermore, there is support in international juris-
prudence93 for the proposition that indefinite detention without trial could 
constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
banned in all circumstances—including in circumstances related to the 
GWOT—by Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 16 of the Convention 
against Torture.94 
 
                                                                                                                      
91. Note, however, the position of the UK Supreme Court, which considered that the 
“normative density” of a specific detention regime, for the purpose of determining its 
compatibility with the ECHR, may be constituted cumulatively of national and interna-
tional norms and regulations. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, [67] 
(Lord Sumption SCJ). 
92. General Comment No. 35, supra note 61, ¶ 15. 
93. See Concluding Observations (United States), supra note 62, ¶ 14; U.N. Comm. against 
Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Israel, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/ISR/CO/5 (2015); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the 
Universal Periodic Review: United States of America, ¶¶ 176.240–176.250, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/30/12 (2015). 














The starting point for any discussion of the legality of detention without 
trial of suspected international terrorists for the duration of the GWOT is 
that such detention constitutes an anathema to basic IHRL principles, 
which find expression in Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the 
ECHR, prohibiting arbitrary detention. Although the prohibition on arbi-
trary detention is not absolute, and can be derogated from or stipulated 
upon in times of armed conflict by principles of IHL, which constitute lex 
specialis, the latter legal move is increasingly viewed as dependent on the 
notion of “comparable safeguards”—that is, on whether the relevant IHL 
rules offer certain substantive and procedural protections against excess in 
the application of detention powers. It appears, in this regard, that there is 
a general acceptance in legal doctrine of the ability of States to rely on the 
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention on internment of POWs to 
deviate from the parallel IHRL norms. This is because the Third Geneva 
Convention provides a detailed regime of POW internment, regulating the 
beginning and end of detention, the conditions of detention and presenting 
certain concrete options for early release (including immediate release upon 
cessation of active hostilities even in the absence of prisoner exchange 
agreement,95 and release due to health reasons).96 Furthermore, in practical 
terms, given the short duration of active hostilities in the vast majority of 
IACs and the availability of prisoner exchange arrangements (“cartels”) 
even during active hostilities,97 it would be highly unlikely for a POW in an 
IAC to languish for years upon years in detention without trial. Thus, “in-
definite detention” in IAC is almost never truly indefinite. 
Almost none of these legal and practical safeguards are available in the 
fight against international terrorism. The rules governing security detention, 
either under NIAC or under Common Article 3 applicable as a “normative 
minimum,” are few and far between, and they do not provide a clear road-
map for early release—a point underscored by the difficult “legacy prob-
                                                                                                                      
95. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 118. 
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(release on parole or promise). Id., art. 21. 
97. Robert Frau, Cartels, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE USE OF FORCE: 
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lem” of dozens of detainees in Guantanamo.98 Nor do these rules allow for 
clear criteria for identifying detainable individuals. It is here that the analo-
gy between IAC and NIAC unravels and, as predicted by Justice 
O’Connor,99 where reliance on a general and non-explicit power to detain 
individuals under the laws of war for the duration of an endless conflict 
becomes legally non-available. 
This insight about the limited pull of the lex specialis argument has al-
ready caused certain jurisdictions to bring their security detention legisla-
tion under constitutional review and led the ECtHR and UN HRC to apply 
IHRL norms as a limit on the power to hold individuals in indefinite deten-
tion without criminal charges in situations not qualifying as IAC.100 Signifi-
cantly, the UN HRC held that even in times of emergency, security deten-
tions must meet “requirements of strict necessity and proportionality” that 
“constrain any derogating measures involving security detention;”101 there 
must also be a showing that the “detention does not last longer than abso-
lutely necessary,” and that “the overall length of possible detention is lim-
ited.”102 In fact, indefinite detention without trial might not only be regard-
ed as arbitrary in nature; it may very well also constitute a form of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—a prohibition that can 
never be derogated from.103 
IHL rules governing NIACs, which contain few if any rules regulating 
detention without trial that offer comparable safeguards to those present 
under IHRL, cannot displace these fundamental and specific IHRL stand-
ards—whether or not one can base on them an independent power to de-
tain. In fact, it looks as if it is the very paucity of safeguards comparable to 
those found under IACs and under IHRL that explains the reluctance of 
national and international law-applying institutions to regard IHL rules 
governing NIACs as an independent basis for the exercise of security de-
tention powers.    
In all events, the logic of co-application of IHL and IHRL invites in-
terpretative interaction between the two bodies of law, resulting in the con-
                                                                                                                      
98. See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Guantanamo ‘Legacy Problem’: Bringing Law-of-War 
Prolonged Military Detention and Criminal Prosecution into Closer Alignment, 7 JOURNAL OF NA-
TIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 527, 530 (2014). 
99. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
100. See supra Part IV. 
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struction of the terms of one body of law in light of those of the other, and 
in reading-in provisions of one body of law into the other (unless such 
read-ins are excluded explicitly or implicitly, by the very nature of the legal 
regime in question). Such an approach has led the ECtHR to construe Se-
curity Council resolutions as IHRL-compatible104 and an Israeli Commis-
sion of Inquiry to read-in IHRL standards into IHL provisions on investi-
gation of war crime allegations.105 The application of this latter approach to 
GWOT-detentions should imply the need to construe the power to engage 
in security detention as limited by IHRL principles of necessity and propor-
tionality, including limits on the overall duration of detention without tri-
al.106 
Ultimately, both IHL and IHRL norms applicable to armed conflicts 
reflect an attempt to strike a balance between security needs and humani-
tarian interests. Such a balancing act sometimes requires States to assume 
certain reasonable security risks in order to avoid excessive harm to fun-
damental human rights of affected individuals. A regime of indefinite de-
tention deviates from this balancing formula because it involves a drastic 
right-limiting measure applied against individuals who pose a security risk 
that is, almost inevitably, speculative in nature, and which is often based on 
information that these individuals had no fair chance to refute.107 As a re-
sult, suspected, yet not convicted, international terrorists may find them-
selves detained for periods of time as long, if not longer, than those im-
posed upon criminals convicted for committing serious violent crimes or 
for aiding and abetting them (note that such criminals are released at the 
                                                                                                                      
104. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08 (2011) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). Even 
the Al-Waheed judgment of the UK Supreme Court supports the proposition that IHRL 
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end of their sentence although they may continue to pose a threat to public 
safety due to the risk of recidivism). 
Finally, as indicated above, the lack of an overall limit on the period of 
security detention constitutes a particularly harsh measure, turning what may 
be a proportionate reaction to a security threat into a disproportionate one, 
possibly constituting a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Consequently, transforming indefinite security detentions into time-limited 
ones, opting for predictable and reasonable time frames for detention, is the 
morally right and legally correct thing to do. 
